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I. INTRODUCTION
As the population grows, so does the conflict between the demand for
agricultural productivity and the need to maintain healthy ecosystems.
Unfortunately, this concern alone does not motivate the agricultural industry to
operate in a more environmentally friendly manner, nor is it an industry that has
1
proven amenable to strict regulation. Indeed, any such effort must face one of
2
the mightiest lobbies of all time. As it functions today, agriculture is
unsustainable and at risk of wiping out more than its fair share of our already

 Associate Professor of Law, Florida International University. The author is grateful for earlybrainstorming feedback provided by J. B. Ruhl and Dan Rohlf, as well as for the helpful practical insights
provided by fellow symposium participants. Thanks also go to Professor Rachael Salcido for her generous
invitation to participate in this symposium.
1. See generally Elizabeth M. Stapleton, Agriculture as Industry: The Failure of Environmental and
Agricultural Policy to Adapt to the Modern Agricultural Landscape, 7 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 321 (2014)
(discussing the development of the agricultural industry into a relatively unregulated sector).
2. See Lauren Etter & Greg Hitt, Farm Lobby Beats Back Assault on Subsidies, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27,
2008, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB120657645419967077 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
(discussing the strength of the farm lobby in defending farm bill subsidies).
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dwindling biodiversity. As demand for agricultural production increases, so do
the ecological risks. One might think that the Endangered Species Act (ESA)
could solve the problem, given that it has strict prohibitions on harming listed
3
species, but the ESA is no match for this industry, which works hard to avoid its
4
reach. Some ESA approaches work better than others, such as regional habitat
conservation plans that allow farmers to destroy some habitat in exchange for
5
contributing to the protection of large and interconnected areas of habitat.
However, a review of the ESA’s implementation in the agricultural context
6
makes it clear that far more is needed.
In recent decades, a variety of approaches to improving conservation efforts
7
on agricultural land have cropped up, such as conservation easements, payment
8
for ecosystem services (PES) programs, the Conservation Reserve Program
9
10
(CRP) to avoid overuse of agricultural land, organic labeling restrictions, and
direct subsidy methods, such as the Environmental Quality Incentives Program
(EQIP) and Conservation Stewardship Program (CSP), which pay farmers to
11
incorporate more environmentally friendly practices. Part II of this Article will
review these existing efforts.
Some of these methods, such as PES and conservation easements, tend to be
implemented by a wide range of entities, both public and private. What we wind
up with is a mix of efforts that sometimes overlap in a haphazard manner. The
disaggregation of agricultural conservation efforts, which is necessitated by the
industry’s successful avoidance of traditional top-down command-and-control
12
13
regulation, is not necessarily a problem. However, in light of these

3. See generally 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–44 (2012). Under the ESA, it is unlawful to “take” any listed
species. Id. § 1538(a)(1)(B). An unlawful taking includes any conduct which would “harm” a listed species.
Id. § 1532(19). “Harm” includes “an act which actually kills or injures wildlife . . . includ[ing] significant
habitat modification or degradation . . . .”. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2014).
4. See, e.g., Kalyani Robbins, Lesser Conservation: The U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service Proposes
Threatened Listing for the Lesser Prairie-Chicken, Then Guts It with Special 4(d) Rule, TRENDS, Nov. 2013
(describing just one broad section 4(d) exception to the take prohibition for agricultural activity).
5. See infra Part II.C for a discussion of regional habitat conservation plans.
6. See, e.g., Robbins, supra note 4.
7. See infra Part II.B.
8. See infra Part II.A.
9. See Conservation Reserve Program, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., FARM SERV. AGENCY, http://www.fsa.
usda.gov/FSA/webapp?area=home&subject=copr&topic=crp (last visited Aug. 4, 2014) (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
10 Organic Labeling, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., AGRIC. MARKETING SERV., http://www.ams.usda.gov/
AMSv1.0/ams.fetchTemplateData.do?template=TemplateA&navID=OrgLabelingLinkNOPOrganicSeal&right
Nav1=OrgLabelingLinkNOPOrganicSeal&topNav=&leftNav=NationalOrganicProgram&page=NOPOrganicLa
beling&resultType=&acct=nopgeninfo (last visited Oct. 24, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
11. See infra Part II.D.
12. See Stapleton, supra note 1, at 325.
13. This is not to say that the regulation avoidance is not itself a problem, but it is too intractable a
problem to focus on here.
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disaggregated and sometimes overlapping spheres of influence, some effort at
integration could reduce the chaos and lead to more consistency nationwide.
Drawing from scholarship focused on transnational regimes, we see that
decentralized (and public-private mixed) governance can be effective and even
14
coordinated. As beneficial programs expand, social norms develop and begin to
15
tie them together. As this occurs, it creates the opportunity to better coordinate
16
and integrate the diverse influences. Part III of this Article explains why
integrated multimodal governance is the most appropriate approach to governing
ecological conservation on agricultural land, especially in light of the political
obstacles to comprehensive regulation.
Given the importance of scale in maximizing the benefit-to-cost ratio when
17
protecting ecosystems, coordination of the various sources of authority is
especially valuable in this context. It would thus be worthwhile to have an entity
capable of taking a holistic ecosystem approach to implementing the array of
existing programs. It is likewise important to share both information and strategy,
in light of the shared goals of the many entities involved in the governance of
ecologically sustainable agriculture. Part IV of this Article considers potential
methods for improving the integration of the array of approaches, as well as the
importance of taking an adaptive management approach to this coordinationseeking venture.
II. EXISTING EFFORTS TO LESSEN THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF
AGRICULTURE
Although there is no comprehensive legislation requiring environmental
18
conservation on agricultural land, there are numerous programs designed to
reach this result. Because the agricultural lobby is so immensely powerful, these
programs tend to be very expensive, as they are entirely voluntary on the part of
19
farmers and thus must benefit them economically. In addition to being costly,
they are also generally uncoordinated with each other. This, when combined with

14. See generally James N. Rosenau, Governing the Ungovernable: The Challenge of a Global
Disaggregation of Authority, 1 REG. & GOVERNANCE 88 (2007) (predicting a system of global governance
based upon norms, informal rules, and regimes as the world is divided into further spheres of influence and
superpowers lose their influence).
15. Id.at 93–94.
16. Id.
17. See Daniel N. Laven et al., Examining Conservation Practice at the Landscape Scale, 22 GEORGE
WRIGHT F. 5, 5 (2005) (describing the importance of using a landscape-scale approach to conservation).
18. See generally Stapleton, supra note 1 (discussing the development of the agricultural industry into a
relatively unregulated sector).
19. See J.B. Ruhl, Agriculture and Ecosystem Services: Strategies for State and Local Governments, 17
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 424, 441–42 (2008) (listing expense among the drawbacks of many of the agricultural
conservation programs).
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20

the farmer initiative for opting in, results in somewhat random geographic
placement of conservation efforts. This Part provides a brief overview of the
most common approaches.
A. Payment for Ecosystem Services
One of the newest and (in this author’s view) most promising approaches to
conservation on agricultural land is Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES).
Ecosystem services have finally begun to receive their due, at least in terms of
scientific appreciation of value, especially since an impressive study that brought
together approximately 1,300 experts from around the globe, culminating in the
21
2005 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (“MEA report”). The MEA report
divided ecosystem services into four categories based upon the functions they
serve: provisioning services (e.g., food or medicine), regulating services (e.g.,
pollination or regulation of air or water quality), cultural services (e.g.,
recreational or educational), and supporting services (e.g., habitat provision or
22
oxygenation). It has been estimated that the economic value of these services
reaches an annual average of $33 trillion, which is 1.8 times the gross national
23
product of the entire earth. Unfortunately, the MEA report also concluded that
roughly 60% of ecosystem services had already been degraded by human activity
24
and that further decline was rapidly underway. Conversion to agricultural use is
25
a leading cause of this destruction.
26
Because of the immense economic value of ecosystem services, combined
27
with the urgency of preserving what is left of them, some governments have
deemed it worthwhile to begin purchasing them from landowners as one would

20. Before those with practical experience lose all faith in this Article’s proposal, it will not involve a
loss of this farmer discretion (the author is aware of how unpalatable this would be). Indeed, by determining the
relative value to various programs of each farmers’ land, it may even be possible to increase some farmers’
negotiating power.
21. CARLOS CORVALAN ET AL., WORLD HEALTH ORG., ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING:
HEALTH SYNTHESIS, A REPORT OF THE MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, at ii (José Sarukhán et al. eds.,
2005) [hereinafter MEA REPORT].
22. Id. at 12.
23. Robert Costanza et al., The Value of the World’s Ecosystem Services and Natural Capital, 387
NATURE 253, 259 (1997).
24. MEA REPORT, supra note 21, at 6–8.
25. Id. at 6.
26. See generally James Salzman, Valuing Ecosystem Services, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 887 (1997) (the
seminal law review article on this topic).
27. See Gro Harlem Brundtland, Op-Ed., Earth Agonistes, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2012, http://www.
nytimes.com/2012/06/19/opinion/earth-agonistes.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (“With our
current growth and development model we are indeed changing the earth system, and as a result rapidly
undermining the resilience of the planet and the future of humanity. The pressures of ecosystem decline,
pollution and resource depletion have become immense, drawing down on the economic prospects of present
and future generations.”).
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28

any traditional commodity. As a result of concretizing this value and creating a
market for these services, even the most hardened business thinker may find that
conservation of at least portions of her land survives a cost-benefit analysis. The
29
PES concept, which was developed first in other countries but has gradually
cropped up throughout the United States, has begun to have a meaningful impact
on agricultural land in areas where such programs are being implemented.
Ultimately, these PES programs are creating a shift in attitude: rather than seeing
conservation as a sacrifice, it is seen as an economically rational choice when
ecosystem services are more valuable than other potential commodities for a
30
given plot of land. When we take into account the multifunctionality of the
land—capable of producing both goods and services—we position ourselves
31
indeed to maximize its economic value.
B. Conservation Easements
Another way that both governments and private organizations pay to protect
land is via conservation easements. This is a restriction on the property’s use,
32
requiring that it be conserved and not exploited for non-conservation values.
33
Most conservation easements are perpetual, as this is preferable for setting
aside land that can be relied upon for habitat and other ecosystem values.
Another factor, one which varies by state law and impacts the reliability of the
28. As this trend has begun to develop, resources have been created to provide guidance for such
programs, which may also improve uniformity, which is preferable in designing new markets. See, e.g., FOREST
TRENDS ET AL., PAYMENTS FOR ECOSYSTEM SERVICES: GETTING STARTED, A PRIMER 4 (2008), available at
http://www.unep.org/pdf/PaymentsForEcosystemServices_en.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
Additional guidance and templates can be downloaded at Template Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES)
Agreements, KATOOMBA GROUP, http://www.katoombagroup.org/regions/international/legal_contracts_care.
php (last visited Oct. 16, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
29. For more background on this development period, see James Salzman, Creating Markets for
Ecosystem Services: Notes from the Field, 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 870, 873–74 (2005).
30. See id. at 888 (encouraging a perspective in which the purchase of ecosystem services is treated the
same as any other cash crop).
31. For a wonderful discussion of this concept of multifunctionality of agricultural land, see Ruhl, supra
note 19 at 431–34.
32. See NANCY A. MCLAUGHLIN, CONSERVATION EASEMENTS: OUTLINE OF RELEVANT LAWS, AG
STANDING, AND CASES AND CONTROVERSIES 9–10, 14 (2014), available at http://web.law.columbia.edu/
sites/default/files/microsites/attorneys-general/outline_of_relevant_laws_ag_standing_and_cases
_and_controversies_final.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (describing federal and state law
provisions that apply to conservation easements); LITTLE TRAVERSE CONSERVANCY, THE CONSERVATION
EASEMENT AS A LAND PROTECTION AND FINANCIAL PLANNING TOOL 4–5, available at http://www.
landtrust.org/ProtectingLand/ConsEaseGuidebook.pdf (indicating that a conservation easement is an agreement
between a landowner and an entity like a conservancy which will restrict future uses of the land); Frequently
Asked Questions, LAND TRUST FOR TENN., http://landtrusttn.org/faq.html (last visited July 9, 2014) (on file with
the McGeorge Law Review) (explaining that conservation easements are voluntary agreements between
landowners, land trusts, government agencies, or other organizations qualified to hold the easement).
33. Nancy A. McLaughlin, Conservation Easements: Perpetuity and Beyond, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 673,
675, 705 (2007).
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ecological value of a conservation easement, is whether third-party enforcement
34
of its terms is permitted. If a conservation easement is perpetual, third-party
enforceable, and on ecologically valuable land, this is arguably the ideal
combination for maximizing its value.
Conservation easements are purchased from landowners by non-profit
35
organizations as well as all levels of government. At the federal level, there are
several programs specifically designed for purchasing conservation easements in
certain ecosystem types. These programs include the Healthy Forests Restoration
36
37
Program, the Wetlands Reserve Program, and the Grassland Reserve
38
Program, the latter two of which are being absorbed into the more
39
comprehensive Agricultural Conservation Easement Program (ACEP). Also
included is the Conservation Reserve Program, in which rental payments are
40
made on short-term leases of land in order to keep it out of agricultural service.
In addition to purchasing conservation easements on agricultural land, the federal
41
government also pays farmers directly to engage in better practices.
One of the more exciting recent developments in the conservation easement
context—especially relevant to this Article as it represents a first step in the
42
direction here proposed—is the National Conservation Easement Database. By
tracking as many conservation easements as possible and mapping them via a
43
single GIS, we not only increase the likelihood of enforcement, but also open
34. See generally Jessica E. Jay, Third-Party Enforcement of Conservation Easements, 29 VT. L. REV.
757 (2005).
35. See KATIE CHANG, LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, 2010 NATIONAL LAND TRUST CENSUS REPORT: A LOOK
AT VOLUNTARY LAND CONSERVATION IN AMERICA 5 (Rob Aldrich & Christina Soto eds., 2011), available at
http://www.landtrustalliance.org/land-trusts/land-trust-census/national-land-trust-census-2010/2010-final-report
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (listing the acres conserved as of 2010 by state, local, and national
land trusts); ROB ALDRICH & JAMES WYERMAN, LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, 2005 NATIONAL LAND TRUST
CENSUS REPORT 12 (Chris Soto & Anne W. Garnett eds., 2006), available at http://www.Northolympic
landtrust.org/Documents/2005LandTrustCensusReport.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (describing
the work of non-profit conservation organizations called land trusts).
36. Healthy Forests Reserve Program, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., NATURAL RES. CONSERVATION SERV.,
http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/main/national/programs/easements/forests/ (last visited June 18,
2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
37. Wetlands Reserve Program, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., NATURAL RES. CONSERVATION SERV., http://www.
nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/main/national/programs/easements/wetlands/ (last visited June 18, 2014) (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review).
38. Grassland Reserve Program, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., NATURAL RES. CONSERVATION SERV., http://www.
nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/main/national/programs/easements/grassland/ (last visited June 18, 2014) (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review).
39. Agricultural Conservation Easement Program, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., NATURAL RES. CONSERVATION
SERV., http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/main/national/programs/easements/acep/ (last visited June 18,
2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
40. Conservation Reserve Program, supra note 9.
41. See infra Part II.D.
42. NATIONAL CONSERVATION EASEMENT DATABASE, http://conservationeasement.us/ (last visited May
21, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
43. See Amy Wilson Morris & Adena R. Rissman, Public Access to Information on Private Land

72

McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 46
44

the door to comprehensive ecosystem-scale land management. The database is
45
populated via self-reporting, however, and is thus incomplete. With adequate
funding to engage in comprehensive data compilation—less dependent on
landowners taking the time to submit it themselves—this database could provide
a truly comprehensive understanding of the impact of conservation easements on
46
any given region or ecosystem.
C. Regional Habitat Conservation Plans via the Endangered Species Act
Another trend in agricultural land conservation is taking place in the context
of the Endangered Species Act (ESA). The ESA does not have statutory
exemptions for agriculture in the way that other environmental statutes do,
though in recent years we have seen the emergence of regulatory deals exempting
agricultural operations from the prohibition against taking certain listed species
so long as they are engaging in some basic conservation practices (that may or
47
may not aid that species). While such arrangements may prove problematic for
48
conservation, the clearly valuable trend is the regional habitat conservation plan
(RHCP), in which multiple covered parties (for our purposes, this might be
multiple farmers in a given region) must contribute to a mitigation plan in
49
exchange for a limited ability to “take” listed species on their land. This ideally
results in conservation of large and interconnected areas of highly desirable
habitat at a scale that cannot be achieved via the traditional individual habitat
50
conservation plan (HCP). It can also reduce administrative costs and improve
implementation as a result of taking the process out of the hands of the individual
51
landowner. Unlike the other methods described in this section, the RHCP does
Conservation: Tracking Conservation Easements, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 1237, 1246 (2009) (indicating that
enforcement of conservation easement restrictions is difficult without accessible conservation easement data).
44. See infra Part IV (explaining the need for a compilation of the data from various programs prior to
embarking on large-scale conservation efforts).
45. NATIONAL CONSERVATION EASEMENT DATABASE, supra note 42.
46. And, of course, if you included the data on each of the other conservation programs the picture would
be crystal clear.
47. See Robbins, supra note 4.
48. See id.
49. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2) (providing for the use of habitat conservation plans in obtaining an
incidental take permit); J. B. Ruhl, Regional Habitat Conservation Planning Under the Endangered Species
Act: Pushing the Legal and Practical Limits of Species Protection, 44 SW. L.J. 1393 (1991) [hereinafter
Regional Habitat Conservation] (describing the use of regional habitat conservations plans).
50. See Regional Habitat Conservation, supra note 49, at 1403–04 (contrasting individual and regional
habitat conservation plans); George Frampton, Ecosystem Management in the Clinton Administration, 7 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 39, 40 (1996) (describing the transformation of the ESA from “emergency room” to “a
comprehensive vehicle for regional multi-species habitat planning”); Robert D. Thornton, Habitat Conservation
Plans: Frayed Safety Nets or Creative Partnerships?, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 94, 99 (2001).
51. See J.B. Ruhl, Harmonizing Distributed Energy and the Endangered Species Act, 4 SAN DIEGO J.
CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 121, 135–37 (2012); J.B. Ruhl, Harmonizing Commercial Wind Power and the
Endangered Species Act Through Administrative Reform, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1769, 1783–85 (2012).
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not require monetary payment to the landowners, as they are compensated with
52
the limited right to incidental take federally listed species. It will be important,
as such permits proliferate, to improve on public participation in the planning, as
53
well as increase adaptive planning.
D. Federal Subsidies for Best Practices
Finally, at least for this list of most common approaches, is the practice of
providing subsidies to farmers and agribusinesses for engaging in more
environmentally conservative methods of production. Examples of such subsidy
54
programs include the Conservation Stewardship Program, the Environmental
55
56
Quality Incentives Program (EQIP), the related EQIP Organic Initiative, and
the various “conservation partnership programs” (state-private funded grants for
57
conservation and restoration efforts). Although there is evidence that subsidy58
linked conservation requirements are making a difference, their value is
somewhat limited by the extensive Farm Bill subsidies that actually (albeit as an
59
unintended consequence) encourage harmful practices. Another concern with
subsidies for environmental stewardship is that it fails to force polluters to
60
internalize their environmental externalities. Of course, the only way to do so is
with command-and-control regulation, which has proven too challenging to
achieve. For this reason, the remainder of this Article continues the effort to work
with what has evolved to make it better.

52. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B)–(2)(A) (2012).
53. Alejandro E. Camacho, Can Regulation Evolve? Lessons from a Study in Maladaptive Management,
55 UCLA L. REV. 293, 314, 355–56 (2007).
54. See Conservation Stewardship Program, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., NATURAL RES. CONSERVATION SERV.,
http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/main/national/programs/financial/csp/ (last visited June 23, 2014) (on
file with the McGeorge Law Review).
55. See Environmental Quality Incentives Program, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., NATURAL RES. CONSERVATION
SERV., http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/main/national/programs/financial/eqip/ (last visited June 23,
2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
56. See 2014 EQIP Organic Initiative, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., NATURAL RES. CONSERVATION SERV.,
http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/detail/national/programs/?cid=nrcs143_008224 (last visited June 23,
2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
57. See, e.g., Regional Conservation Partnership Program, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., NATURAL RES.
CONSERVATION SERV., http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/main/national/programs/farmbill/rcpp/ (last
visited June 23, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Conservation Partners Program, NAT’L FISH
& WILDLIFE FOUND., http://www.nfwf.org/conservationpartners/Pages/home.aspx#.U6id57G9Z8E (last visited
June 23, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); New York State Conservation Partnership Program,
NY.GOV, http://www.dec.ny.gov/lands/48901.html (last visited June 23, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review);
58. See Erin Morrow, Agri-Environmentalism: A Farm Bill for 2007, 38 TEX. TECH L. REV. 345, 360–
61 (2006).
59. Id. at 371.
60. See Margaret Rosso Grossman, Agriculture and the Polluter Pays Principle: An Introduction, 59
OKLA. L. REV. 1, 3 (2006).
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III. INTEGRATED MULTIMODAL GOVERNANCE: THE SWEET SPOT FOR
AGRICULTURE
Imagine a large city with several modes of transportation: a subway system,
buses, and a tourist trolley. This multimodality allows the city to achieve various
goals that may not all be possible with a single modality alone. It can move
people quickly (without excess stopping and slow-downs) between residential
areas and downtown via the subway system. It can get people to a wider range of
less common destinations, especially for workers in more spread-out
establishments such as fast-food chains, via the bus system. It can take tourists to
a network of historic, entertaining, or otherwise appealing locations in eyecatching trolleys. Now imagine that instead of creating a single transportation
agency to plan these systems, the city created three separate agencies and did not
ask them to work together. Indeed, each agency is under the impression that it
must accomplish all possible goals—meeting all the needs of the metropolis—on
its own. No coordination of track lines or station locations is allowed either. I
need not describe the redundancy, gaps, conflicts, and inefficiencies that might
result, as I am sure you can think of many. To avoid such redundancy and target
efforts where they are most needed, the city will ideally opt to integrate the
61
operation of this multimodal transportation system. Some goals will be better
achieved via one or the other system and a single perspective will allow for such
targeting.
Land management, especially for the purposes of ecosystem resilience and
maximization of ecosystem services, is heavily scale-dependent. While it is not
entirely inconsequential for a small player to make good stewardship choices on
62
his or her parcel at random, it is far preferable (and, frankly, essential) to
63
manage conservation practices at the landscape scale. We have seen our greatest
ecosystem management successes when vast land areas have been managed in a
64
unified manner in spite of the numerous and varied stakeholders involved.
Ecosystems thrive when we prioritize both size and connectivity of protected

61. See EDWARD WEINER, URBAN TRANSPORTATION PLANNING IN THE UNITED STATES: AN
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW (1999) (recognizing the need for centralized urban transportation planning, but
lamenting that some cities have chosen a path of decentralization of authority instead).
62. Of course, as with other environmentally conservative behaviors (e.g., recycling or use of lowemissions vehicles), this will have greater value when a greater percentage of people do so.
63. See Laven et al., supra note 17, at 5 (describing the importance of using a landscape-scale approach
to conservation).
64. Judith A. Layzer, Ecosystem-Based Management: An Empirical Assessment, in THE LAWS OF
NATURE: REFLECTIONS ON THE EVOLUTION OF ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT LAW AND POLICY Ch. 2 (University
of Akron Press, Kalyani Robbins ed., 2013). See also, e.g., GREATER YELLOWSTONE ECOSYSTEM,
YELLOWSTONE RESOURCES AND ISSUES HANDBOOK (2013), available at http://www.nps.gov/yell/planyour
visit/upload/ri_2013_ecosystem.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); EVERGLADESRESTORATION.GOV,
http://www.evergladesrestoration.gov (last visited Mar. 24, 2015) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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65

areas. This is why integrated multimodal governance is the best feasible system
for ecosystem conservation on agricultural lands.
Of course, the first question is why multimodal at all? If a centralized
perspective is so valuable to ecosystem management, why not regulate the
balance between agricultural use and habitat conservation with a single mode of
governance? This might make sense as a completely abstract concept applied to a
hypothetical newly-created state, but U.S. history, culture, economics, and
politics have already firmly developed the value of independence for farmers and
big-ag alike (albeit for different reasons, with the former relying more on the
66
history/culture aspects and the latter more on the economics/politics). As
mentioned at the outset, this problem is intractable, and no effort is made in this
Article to solve it. Instead, the goal here is to take what we have—multimodal
governance that has sprung up from many varied sources—and work with it by
proposing an approach that might maximize value both to the environment and to
farmers via an overseeing entity. Integrated multimodal governance, while not a
panacea nor appropriate for all contexts, is the best possible approach to the
particular context of conservation on agricultural land.
Tony Arnold first identified integrationist multimodality as an emerging
approach to environmental law in his 2011 article, Fourth-Generation
67
Environmental Law: Integrationist and Multimodal. He made clear, however,
that he did not intend his work to be normative but rather sought to identify this
68
emergence, for better or worse. Indeed, some contexts will benefit more than
others from such an approach, and in some cases it may be entirely
69
inappropriate. This Article, conversely, does express a normative perspective,
applied to the narrow context of ecosystem management in highly agricultural
regions. “Multimodality is a much broader phenomenon that appears in complex
evolutionary systems and in human efforts to interact with complex problems or
70
tasks by using multiple methods.” Integrated multimodality is thus a process of
coordinating these multiple methods.
The many programs discussed in Part II of this Article are noble efforts to
contribute substantial resources to getting farmers to implement conservation
approaches to their agricultural operations or to set aside some of their land from

65. See Laven et al., supra note 17, at 5 (indicating that biology and landscape conservation goals are
best served by large-scale efforts); David A. Perry & Michael P. Amaranthus, Disturbance, Recovery, and
Stability, in CREATING A FORESTRY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 49 (Kathryn A. Kohm & Jerry F. Franklin eds.,
1997).
66. See Stapleton, supra note 1, at 325 (examining the factors that have allowed the agricultural industry
to largely escape regulation).
67. Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Fourth-Generation Environmental Law: Integrationist and
Multimodal, 35 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 771 (2011).
68. See id. at 772.
69. See id. at 880 (describing circumstances in which integrationist multimodality may fail).
70. Id. at 793.
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cultivation entirely. However, these programs respond to participant applications
individually, which results in a somewhat scattershot impact on the landscape.
Moreover, they operate separately from one another, which adds yet another
layer of blindness to the particular ecosystem needs. To maximize the value of
the many dollars spent on these programs, it is necessary to manage the
landscape holistically at a scale that reflects the functioning of the ecosystems
71
72
upon it. When we look at the multifunctionality of a given parcel of land, and
attempt to compare the value of goods production with that of services (in order
to make the best use of that land), we need to know what value that land has to
the ecosystem of which it is a part. This requires a more comprehensive
viewpoint, especially when we consider that this value will depend in part on
what other farmers are doing with their land.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
The integration of our multiple modes of implementing ecosystem
conservation on agricultural lands does not necessarily require a single
programmatic entity, which is likely unattainable in this context. It will, however,
require substantial coordination of the myriad programs as well as perhaps some
additional gap-filling proposals. Connections must be developed among actors,
ecosystem needs at the relevant scales, and methodology being implemented
73
throughout the relevant geographic area. The value of connecting the dots and
74
integrating the management of these programs is substantial, but in light of the
intensity of farmer and big-ag independence, the real question is how to achieve
it.
While it is likely impossible to impose mandatory participation in these
programs, which farmers would interpret as an assault on the sense of autonomy
75
that they enjoy and expect, it is possible to provide guidance and connections
among all actors (whether agricultural or conservation program administrators)
via a single entity capable of seeing the big picture. This single entity to
holistically oversee agricultural land conservation would compile and overlay the
76
data from all existing programs, both public and private. Instead of haphazard
individual-farmer-initiated implementation, this entity would provide on-theground guidance to landowners regarding preferred uses for their lands, with an

71. See D. Scott Slocombe, Implementing Ecosystem-Based Management, 43 BIOSCIENCE 612, 620
(1993).
72. See Ruhl, supra note 19, at 428, 434 (identifying the need to assign economic value to ecosystem
services in order to encourage farmers to move toward multifunctional land use).
73. See Arnold, supra note 67, at 867–74.
74. See supra Part III.
75. See Stapleton, supra note 1, at 325.
76. This would be similar to the Conservation Easement Database discussed in Part II.B above, only far
more comprehensive.
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eye toward habitat and ecosystem-service needs as well as commodity demand.
In other words, the interdisciplinary team making up this entity would be looking
to maximize at least two values, goods and services, and potentially a third,
ecosystem health independent of service provision, for the sake of the future.
In addition to providing oversight for the combined efforts of all programs
and seeking to balance these efforts based on areas of greater need via
individualized guidance to farmers, this entity would also operate as a think tank,
generating gap-filling policy proposals based on this comprehensive viewpoint. It
would operate at the watershed scale with regional offices. While decisionmaking guidance regarding geographic placement of conservation land would
take place on this regional or watershed scale, at a national level the entity would
disseminate, to the extent appropriate, valuable innovations and information.
This, of course, would also be the scale of any broader policy guidance.
This new entity could be a federal agency with watershed-based field offices.
The upside to this would be reliable funding (once appropriated) and greater
accountability. Alternatively, it could be a private organization, presumably with
not-for-profit status. While this creates the need for adequate charitable interest
to bring funding, if feasible it could help to avoid some of the drawbacks to the
government approach. The most notable such drawback is the risk of agency
capture by special interests (of course, this risk is lessened by the guidance-level
authority of the agency, but its influence could still be great enough to attract
such efforts), but there is also the problem of distrust of government, which is
widespread in the agricultural community. A private non-profit seeking to
maximize both agricultural success and ecological values may be more palatable
to landowners. It would be a source of free expert guidance through the thicket of
federal, state, and private programs available to the farmer, resulting in greater
feelings of trust.
Whether public or private, the primary goal of this organization or agency
would be to maximize efficient use of the land resource, thereby improving both
economic and ecological value. Each parcel (or portion of a parcel) of land has a
different best use based on comparing its ecological value (taking into account its
77
potential impact on ecosystem services) with its commodity production value.
Individual farmers are unlikely to know how to maximize the value of their land
without expert guidance. That guidance, in turn, depends upon access to
ecosystem-wide information—information that administrators of individual
programs a farmer chooses to contact may not have.
V. CONCLUSION
When systems develop in a piecemeal fashion with many different
participants, oftentimes the result is less than optimal. At some point in time it
77. See Ruhl, supra note 19, at 434.
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becomes necessary to take stock of what we have and consider what is working
well (such as paying for the ecological benefits we seek from farmers) and what
is not (such as the failure to maximize the value of each parcel of land in relation
to the uses occurring on neighboring parcels). Typically the value of a
comprehensive strategy is attained via centralized regulation of a field, but in
complex and politically fraught areas such as conservation on agricultural land,
this is not feasible. Given that the multimodal approach appears unavoidable,
value must be maximized more creatively. The proposal in this Article is a broadstrokes effort to simply begin the discussion of what can be done to bring
together the implementation of otherwise unconnected programs. Without doing
so, waste will continue and potentially worsen. When we work with complete
information regarding the most valuable use of each increment of our resources,
waste can be minimized, and this is an area in which we could certainly use a
bigger pie.
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